University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Law Faculty Publications

1-2013

Heed Not the Umpire (Justice Ginsburg Called NFIB)
Nicole Huberfeld
University of Kentucky College of Law, nicole.huberfeld@uky.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Nicole Huberfeld, Heed Not the Umpire (Justice Ginsburg Called NFIB), 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. Height.
Scrutiny 43 (2013).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Heed Not the Umpire (Justice Ginsburg Called NFIB)
Notes/Citation Information
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law Heightened Scrutiny, Vol. 15 (January 2013), pp.
43-55

This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/292

HEED NOT THE UMPIRE (JUSTICE GINSBURG CALLED NFIB)
Nicole Huberfeld∗
I. INTRODUCTION
To understand the scale of the national problems addressed by
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“the ACA”), think of
everyone you know who has blue eyes. Now imagine that every one of
those people does not have health insurance. This means that they
cannot gain access to the healthcare system except by visiting an
emergency room, unless they have large amounts of liquid assets and
can pay out of pocket. Some of the blue-eyed people will be healthy,
some may have chronic conditions, some may be terminally ill; but,
their health status only serves to keep them out of the health insurance market and thus distant from consistent medical care, unless
they qualify for federal programs by virtue of their age or their poverty. This was the scale of the problem at the time of the 2008 presidential election: nearly fifty million Americans did not have health
insurance because the old mechanisms for obtaining insurance were
failing. Just as one in six Americans has blue eyes, likewise one in six
Americans had no health insurance, and the inability to obtain access
1
to medical care had become as random as birth traits.
The pervasiveness of our healthcare problem seems to have bypassed most justices on the Supreme Court in the landmark case Na2
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB). And early
commentary predominantly has focused on the constitutionality of
the individual mandate, which codified the idea that Americans must
have minimum health insurance coverage by January 1, 2014 or pay a
3
tax penalty. Further narrowing the conversation, much of the postdecision commentary has also focused on Chief Justice Roberts’s con∗

1

2
3

Gallion & Baker Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. Comments are welcome: nicole.huberfeld@uky.edu. Many thanks to Elizabeth Weeks Leonard for her insights and
to Shannon Leahy and Kathryn Swany for diligent research assistance. Thanks always DT.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Health Data Interactive: No Health Insurance, Under Age 65: US 1999–2010 (Source: NHIS), http://205.207.175.93/HDI/
TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=453 (last visited Dec. 12, 2012) (displaying rates
of uninsurance by age group and other demographic data).
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010).
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4

stitutional analysis and its interplay with the joint dissent. This narrow scrutiny has resulted in missed opportunities: first, a critique of
the justices’ stilted legislative interpretation and lack of deference to
Congress’s legislative expertise. And second, an appreciation for Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting and concurring opinion, which approached the constitutional questions in NFIB with an emphasis on
understanding the nature of the healthcare crisis that led to the legislative choices in the ACA. Justice Ginsburg’s nuanced approach to
the facts in NFIB led her to the correct constitutional analysis. This
essay will shine a light on these issues with a particular focus on Justice Ginsburg’s approach to the case.
II. THE ACA MISUNDERSTOOD
Congress expressed a broad understanding of its enumerated
powers in the ACA but did not exercise its Article I authority in a
5
manner inconsistent with existing precedent. The ACA contained
ten titles and many moving parts, but the broad goal of the law was to
reform the national markets in healthcare to make all individuals insured and insurable. The two ACA provisions at issue in NFIB were
the minimum essential coverage provision, which requires Americans
to have a health insurance home by 2014 or pay a self-reported tax

4

5

See, e.g., David B. Rivkin Jr., Lee A. Casey & Andrew M. Grossman, NFIB v. Sebelius and the
Triumph of Fig-Leaf Federalism, 2011–12 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2012/scr-2012-rivkin.pdf; ERIKA K. LUNDER & JENNIFER
STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42698, NFIB V. SEBELIUS: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE (2012); John Elwood, What Did the Court “Hold” About the Commerce
Clause and Medicaid?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 2, 2012, 11:28 AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/02/what-did-the-court-hold-about-the-commerceclause-and-medicaid/; Deborah Pearlstein, Early Thoughts on the Health Care Case,
BALKINIZATION (June 28, 2012, 5:56 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/06/earlythoughts-on-health-care-case.html; Steven D. Schwinn, Chief Justice Roberts’s Necessary and
Proper Clause, CONST. L. PROF BLOG (July 2, 2012) http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
conlaw/2012/07/chief-justice-robertss-necessary-and-proper-clause.html; Ilya Shapiro, We
Won Everything But the Case, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2012, 9:38 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/we-won-everything-but-the-case/; Ilya Somin, A
Taxing, But Potentially Hopeful Decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 6:13 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-taxing-but-potentially-hopeful-decision/;
Laurence H. Tribe, Chief Justice Roberts Comes Into His Own and Saves the Court While Preventing a
Constitutional
Debacle,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
28,
2012,
3:41
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/chief-justice-roberts-comes-into-his-own-and-savesthe-court-while-preventing-a-constitutional-debacle/.
Two symposia provide a snapshot of recent literature on the ACA: The American Right to
Health: Constitutional, Statutory, and Contractual Healthcare Rights in the United States, 38 AM.
J.L. & MED. 243 (2012); Everything But the Merits: Analyzing the Procedural Aspects of the Health
Care Litigation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 691 (2012).
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penalty, and the expansion of Medicaid, which facilitates public
6
health insurance for the most impoverished members of our society.
With regard to the minimum coverage provision, popularly
dubbed the “individual mandate,” Congress described the law as regulating both healthcare services and health insurance as a “significant
7
part of the national economy.” Since 1944, Congress has understood
8
that insurance may be regulated as interstate commerce. But, importantly, Congress was regulating more than insurance in the
ACA—it was leveling the insurance playing field to create near universal access to the healthcare system (which is also modified in mul9
tifarious ways by the ACA). Congress was aware of states that had
failed at universal coverage when they did not institute an insurance
coverage requirement, and legislative findings specifically pointed to
the success experienced in Massachusetts in achieving better
healthcare through creating an individual mandate to support its
10
goal of universal coverage. Despite the extensive legislative history
and the explicit legislative findings within the body of the law, Chief
Justice Roberts and the joint dissent rejected Congress’s decisions
with regard to the purposes and methods of regulating the
11
healthcare market in NFIB.

6

7

8
9

10
11

132 S. Ct. at 2580–82 (majority opinion) (discussing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010)
(the individual mandate) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 1396c, 1396d(y)(1)
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (provisions of the Medicaid expansion)).
42 U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. IV 2010) (describing the effects of the “[r]equirement to maintain minimum essential coverage” (health insurance) on the “national economy and interstate commerce”).
See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
In the United States, health insurance acts as a doorway to medical care. Though the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) creates a point of rescue in
emergency rooms, those without health insurance cannot access medical care with any
consistency unless they are wealthy enough to pay for their care out of pocket. See
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006); see generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COVERAGE MATTERS:
INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE (2001); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, INSURING AMERICA’S
HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2004) (both monographs explaining the
connection between insurance and access and the vital role insurance plays in consistent
medical care in the United States).
42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D) (Supp. IV 2010) (“In Massachusetts, a similar requirement has
strengthened private employer-based coverage . . . .”).
See Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 56–57, 73–74 (2013) (critiquing the lack of deference to Congress’s legislative expertise); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Contempt of Court, BOSTON REVIEW,
Nov./Dec. 2012, at 10, available at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.6/
pamela_s_karlan_supreme_court_contempt_congress.php (discussing the Court’s lack of
deference to Congress and the executive branch in a variety of cases).
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Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion began with an exposition on the
12
virtues of federalism. The Roberts Court’s approach to federalism is
no longer a mystery; reiterating Justice Kennedy’s federalism paean
13
from Bond v. United States, Roberts extolled federalism as a protector
14
of not only the states but also individuals. The Chief Justice’s interest in continuing the Rehnquist Court’s active enforcement of the
Tenth Amendment is now clear, though interestingly, the Tenth
15
Amendment itself made rare appearances in the opinion.
16
While their opinions described the ACA, neither Chief Justice
Roberts nor the members of the joint dissent appeared to be concerned with its overarching purposes or Congress’s stated goals. The
description of the law written by Chief Justice Roberts was brief,
which unto itself is not revealing. More importantly, his brevity highlighted an ostensible disinterest in the language and purpose of the
law. The Chief Justice gave an impression of holding his nose while
17
diving into the lengthy constitutional analysis that followed. Both

12

13
14

15

16
17

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577–80 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). The challenge did involve federalism challenges and principles, and the Medicaid expansion directly affects
the federal-state relationship, but by all accounts, the focus of this opinion and its commentary was the individual mandate. The Medicaid expansion is the blockbuster aspect
of the opinion, and the federalism exposition is given context by the plurality’s ultimate
holding that the expansion was unconstitutionally coercive, but Roberts’s discussion of
federalism was a preamble for the whole opinion and somewhat misplaced in the context
of the minimum coverage provision. See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism:
Reconciling Collective Action Federalism and Libertarian Federalism in the Obamacare Litigation
and Beyond, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 288 (2012) (critiquing the role of federalism in the NFIB
litigation).
131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2577–80 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Justice Kennedy also expressed his
desire to limit spending in Comstock: “The limits upon the spending power have not been
much discussed, but if the relevant standard is parallel to the Commerce Clause cases,
then the limits and the analytic approach in those precedents should be respected.”
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582 (majority opinion) (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s rejection
of the States’ Tenth Amendment claim); id. at 2643 (joint dissent) (citing the Tenth
Amendment as affirming the “structural limits on federal power”); U.S. CONST. amend. X
(“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). Arguably this is
because the Court intended to describe Congress as exceeding its enumerated powers,
but it also described the dangers to the states, which are protected by the Tenth Amendment. One would expect more direct reference to that amendment in such a discussion.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580–82 (majority opinion); id. at 2644–46, 2657 (joint dissent).
The Chief Justice stated:
We do not consider whether the Act embodies sound policies. That judgment is
entrusted to the Nation’s elected leaders. We ask only whether Congress has the
power under the Constitution to enact the challenged provisions. . . . Members of
this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the
expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the
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the Roberts opinion and the joint dissent moved quickly past the facts
18
to expound their constitutional theories.
The best example of this disregard for the facts was that the United States argued that it was regulating the healthcare market, for
which health insurance facilitates a point of access as well as a method of finance; yet, the Chief Justice and the joint dissent held that the
pertinent market being regulated was health insurance, not the
19
broader healthcare market. Perceived through the lens of the doc20
trine of constitutional avoidance, as well as the deferential level of
review the Court traditionally applies to exercises of the commerce
21
power, this redefinition of the market being regulated was notably
22
improper. In addition, it displayed a stilted understanding of the

18

19

20

21

22

people disagree with them. It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.
See id. at 2577, 2579 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
This dynamic was echoed in the Roberts dissent in the other Medicaid decision during
the October 2011 term, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211–
15 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
For just one example of this health insurance market choice, see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (disregarding the United States’ position that health insurance
is part of the healthcare market); see also id. at 2644 (joint dissent) (phrasing the problem as one of “health insurance contracts”). Ultimately, this rejection of the United
States’ articulation of the commercial market being regulated facilitated the conclusion
that Congress had the power to tax a choice not to purchase health insurance. Upholding the individual mandate as a tax, Roberts accepted that the exercise of the taxing power required thinking differently about the individual mandate. Instead of requiring purchase, the taxing power allows Congress to “impos[e] a tax on those who do not buy that
product.” Id. at 2593 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153–54 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657
(1895))) (describing the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Court wrote: “‘[T]he
elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save
a statute from unconstitutionality.’”).
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18–19, 22 (2005). The Court wrote: “In assessing
the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Id. at 22 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
557 (1995); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276–80
(1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155–56 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 299–301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
252–53 (1964)).
See Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the Roberts Court Especially Activist? A Study of Invalidating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws, 61 EMORY L.J. 737 (2012) (empirically
analyzing a data set that indicates that a justice’s ideology strongly correlates with the justice’s willingness to overturn a law of the opposite ideology and to uphold a law of the
same ideology; one could infer that the Chief Justice’s conservative perspective made him
more willing to second guess the wisdom of the ACA’s substance and structure).
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ACA’s broadly inclusive approach to health insurance and thus
healthcare access.
Likewise, Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion and the joint
dissent mischaracterized, and misunderstood, the nature of the Medicaid expansion enacted in the ACA. This amendment to the Medicaid Act expands eligibility to citizens under age 65 whose gross in23
come does not exceed 133% of the federal poverty level as of 2014.
States initially will be fully funded by the federal government for the
cost of covering the expansion population; the federal match will
phase down to ninety cents on the Medicaid dollar, a much higher
24
match than states typically receive (50 to 83 cents). States’ noncompliance with the Medicaid Act can end all or part of their Medicaid funding, but the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) has never exercised the option of total fund25
ing cut-off, because it would harm enrollees.
As a statutory matter, the eligibility expansion was not radical, as
the Medicaid Act has always dictated the major elements of the program that create a federal floor on which states may build. Also,
since its inception in 1965, the Medicaid Act has authorized the Secretary of HHS to withdraw all Medicaid funding if a state is noncom26
pliant with the law. Further, as part of the effort to achieve universal
health insurance coverage, eliminating eligibility variation was highly
practical given the resistance to a more unitary reform of the health
insurance system. But, the Medicaid expansion was also a philosophical change that federalized the definition of eligibility for Medicaid
and rejected the long-standing limitation on assisting only the “de27
serving poor.”
Both the Roberts plurality and the joint dissent accepted a stilted
theory of the Medicaid expansion that the new category of eligibility
was not part of the Medicaid Act but instead was part of the ACA. As
I and my co-authors have explained, this interpretation of the Medi23
24
25

26
27

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. IV 2010).
Id. § 1396d(y)(1).
Justice Kagan provided this answer for General Verrilli when he could not during oral
arguments (perplexing, given Justice Kagan’s ultimate conclusion that the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally coercive). See Nicole Huberfeld, Uncertainty on ACA Day 3
(Exhaustion Sets In), CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 28, 2012, 12:52 AM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/03/uncertainty-on-aca-day-3exhaustion-sets-in.html; see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–07 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (holding that the Medicaid expansion is unconstitutional).
42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006). In other words, the potential penalty for state noncompliance
is neither radical nor new, despite the plurality’s contrary view.
For more on the threads of states’ rights and deserving poor in Medicaid’s history, see
Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 436–53 (2011).
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28

caid expansion is incorrect. It was wrong from a statutory perspective, because the Medicaid Act has always set the floor for Medicaid
eligibility. It was wrong from a constitutional perspective, because
the premise that Medicaid was divided into two programs led to the
faulty conclusion that the expansion was not germane and thus was
unconstitutionally coercive.
The United States defended its exercise of the spending power as
consistent with the nature of the General Welfare Clause, consistent
with the Court’s spending power decisions, and consistent with prin29
ciples of cooperative federalism. All of these defenses were correct
given the existing jurisprudence; but, a long-standing spending program such as Medicaid magnifies the under-theorization of the Dole
30
test for conditions on federal spending. The states did not challenge the four-part test established by Dole; instead, they asked the
Court to enliven the previously unenforced idea of unconstitutionally
31
coercive conditional spending. The states offered no standard for
solidifying the coercion theory beyond the bare assertion of their in32
ability to leave the Medicaid program. Seven justices adopted this
thin idea, and none of them articulated a rule for coercion beyond
stating that it was obvious in this case based on their interpretation of
33
Medicaid.
Thus, for the plurality and the joint dissent, it appears that NFIB
was a vehicle for constitutional change. Not only did Chief Justice
Roberts’s plurality skate over the realities of healthcare in the United
States, it misconstrued the basic structure and nature of the Medicaid
program, leading to the biggest doctrinal change in Spending Power
34
jurisprudence since the Lochner Era. Because the plurality forms
the precedent to be followed by lower federal courts, it is important
that these errors not be perpetuated; one hopes that Justice Ginsburg’s more thorough opinion will inform future decisions.
28
29

30
31
32
33
34

Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 11 (detailing the reasons that this legislative
interpretation is incorrect).
For more on the briefs of the United States in Douglas and Florida v. HHS, see Nicole Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the Court: Discordant Advocacy Reflects Conflicting Attitudes,
21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 513 (2012).
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (outlining a four-part test for the
conditioning of federal spending).
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the Court, supra note 29, at 528.
See Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the Court, supra note 29, at 530.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–07 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at
2661–68 (joint dissent).
See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 11, at 46–76 (critiquing the indeterminate contours of the freshly constructed coercion doctrine in light of the Court’s factual
missteps in the Medicaid analysis).
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III. AN OPPOSING VIEW OF HEALTHCARE REFORM
Justice Ginsburg, writing a dissent in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined, began her opinion not with an explication of federalism but with an explanation of the national scale of the
35
problems being addressed by the ACA. Likening it to the passage of
the Social Security Act in the 1930s, Justice Ginsburg described the
ACA as Congress’s effort to reform the entire healthcare market, a
market that accounts for nearly 18% of the gross domestic product, a
market in which everyone will participate but many cannot predict
36
when. Justice Ginsburg described the nationwide problems of uninsurance and escalating costs and noted that the states could not ad37
dress this problem on their own. She observed that Congress very
clearly has the power to create a single-payer health insurance mechanism but that it chose to protect the roles of private insurers and
38
states in fashioning the ACA’s national market reforms.
Thus, rather than beginning with a deconstruction of congressional authority, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent displayed a thorough understanding of the problems facing American healthcare that drove
Congress to find a federal solution to a national problem. Both the
discussion of the individual mandate and the discussion of Medicaid
began with extensive explanations of the healthcare realities at stake,
then applied those basic facts to the provisions of the ACA in ques39
tion, before providing a constitutional conclusion. The extra step of
understanding the program facilitated a thicker analysis that should
have carried the day.
Like Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion, Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion expressed that the policy embraced by the ACA was Con40
gress’s to create, especially in defining the market being regulated;
unlike the plurality opinion, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent expressed def-

35
36
37

38
39
40

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609–12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2609–10.
Here is the flip side of Congress’s reliance on the Massachusetts model. Massachusetts
submitted a brief describing the influx of out-of-staters who took advantage of the state’s
universal coverage and encouraging a national solution to the problem of uninsurance
and underinsurance. See id. at 2612. Cooter and Siegel have described this issue as a
problem of collective action that requires federal intervention rather than disparate state
efforts. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010).
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See, e.g., id. at 2629 (describing the nature and history of Medicaid as context for understanding the expansion).
Id. at 2619.
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41

erence to Congress’s decision-making.
This national market for
medicine and the impact of health insurance on that market led Justice Ginsburg to conclude, correctly, that “[s]traightforward application” of the “rational basis” review typically afforded national economic policymaking led to an easy conclusion that “Congress had a
rational basis for concluding that the uninsured, as a class, substan42
tially affect interstate commerce.” Working within the “novel constraint” (inactivity) on Congress’s commerce power fashioned by
Roberts and the joint dissent, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that all
Americans participate in the healthcare market, thus they are not
“inactive” for purposes of the new commerce analysis. She also
pointed out that risk pooling requires that everyone participate, re43
gardless of their youth or apparent health. The Ginsburg dissent on
the individual mandate ended with an important warning against
44
specious slippery slope arguments and a reiteration that novel line
drawing does not stop the law from being an appropriate exercise of
45
congressional authority.
Turning to the Medicaid expansion, Justice Ginsburg recognized
the “federalism-based limits on the use of Congress’ conditional
spending power” but also exposed Chief Justice Roberts’s fallacious
46
claim that the ACA created a “new” Medicaid program. Joined only
by Justice Sotomayor, she underlined the key fact that Medicaid is not
two programs but one program with one goal, “to enable poor per47
sons to receive basic health care when they need it.” Justice Ginsburg noted that the Medicaid expansion did exactly what Medicaid
has always done, “enable States to provide medical assistance” to the
48
poor, and did not amend most of the Medicaid Act. She rejected
the premise that the Medicaid expansion constituted “a shift in kind,
not merely degree,” when prior statutory expansions did not receive

41

42
43

44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 2614–15 (“Whatever one thinks of the policy decision Congress made, it was Congress’ prerogative to make it. Reviewed with appropriate deference, the minimum coverage provision . . . should survive measurement under the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses.”).
Id. at 2617.
Id. at 2618–20. Justice Ginsburg’s emphatic rejoinder to Roberts and the joint dissent
that “Virtually everyone, I reiterate, consumes health care at some point in his or her life”
seems especially poignant coming from a cancer survivor. Id. at 2620.
Especially those involving broccoli.
Id. at 2624–28 (warning against the new line being drawn in Necessary and Proper Clause
analysis).
Id. at 2634.
Id. at 2630.
Id. at 2635.
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49

this treatment. Justice Ginsburg also critiqued the characterization
of the expansion as a new program because courts should afford “a
50
large measure of respect” to Congress’s description of its own law.
Justice Ginsburg also observed that Congress has power to repeal
the Medicaid Act and replace it with “Medicaid II,” leading her to ac51
cuse the plurality and joint dissent of arbitrary line-drawing. This
point highlighted the contradictory formalism expressed by the plurality and dissent, that despite a statutory provision dating to the creation of Medicaid that reserves the right to amend or modify the program, Medicaid could not be expanded in the manner chosen by
Congress in the ACA because the states were somehow protected
52
from such a modification.
Justice Ginsburg expressed concern about the Court’s failure to
“fix the outermost line” of the “point at which pressure turns into
53
compulsion” and warned that the Court failed to answer numerous
questions. These questions, including whether courts measure coercion by the amount offered to the states by the federal government,
the percentage of the state’s budget affected, what effects on states
should figure into the constitutional analysis, and the combined ef54
fect of states refusing the spending conditions, are already inviting
55
new litigation. Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg suggested that coercion
56
is a political question that courts should not and cannot decide, yet
seven justices agreed in principle that coercion is a judicially administrable concept. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent helped to highlight a major problem with the legislative interpretation adopted by the plurality’s opinion.
Even though only two justices found the Medicaid expansion to
be a constitutional exercise of spending power, the ACA was saved by
the severability provision in the Medicaid Act (Section 1303), which
explicitly prevents the entire Social Security Act (of which Medicaid is
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

56

Id. at 2639. For more factual analysis regarding the inaccuracies of the Roberts plurality
on Medicaid, see Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 11.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
For more on Chief Justice Roberts’s formalist approach, see Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax,
To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 95–102 (2012).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2639–40 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2640–41.
See, e.g., Petitioner’s Motion for Injunctive Relief, Mayhew v. Sebelius, No. 12-2059 (1st
Cir. Sep. 4, 2012) (requesting an order to require the government more expeditiously to
approve Maine’s request to amend its Medicaid state plan and make eligibility changes as
part of a plan to balance its state budget). But see Mayhew v. Sebelius, No. 12-2059, 2012
U.S. App. LEXIS 21083 (1st Cir. Sep. 13, 2012) (summarily denying petitioner’s motion
for injunctive relief as moot).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2640–41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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a part) from being invalidated if any provision is found to be uncon57
stitutional. The plurality’s interpretive legerdemain was therein revealed: section 1303, which was enacted in 1935 when the Social Security Act was passed, saved the Medicaid expansion from being
struck down, even though the plurality had found the expansion to
be a separate program from existing Medicaid for purposes of its
58
constitutional analysis. In other words, the severability of the Medicaid Act saved a “new program” that was not Medicaid enough for
purposes of Congress’s exercise of spending authority, but it was
Medicaid enough for purposes of limiting the remedy for coercion.
This type of severability analysis appears to be novel, and it has
59
thrown other aspects of the Medicaid expansion into some disarray.
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined the majority in this bizarre legislative maneuver, which was consistent with their analysis of
Medicaid being one program and thus the expansion being constitu60
tional. A majority of five ultimately protected the Medicaid expansion, at least to a degree, by making it an unenforceable mandate that
states could choose not to participate in without jeopardizing their
61
existing Medicaid funding. But, the not-Medicaid-but-Medicaid legislative gymnastics highlight the faulty factual findings of the majority
in contrast with the internal consistency of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.
IV. CONCLUSION
In short, Justice Ginsburg endeavored to get the facts right, making hers the opinion to read for anyone who wants to understand
how the constitutional questions should have been answered in NFIB
as well as how the healthcare programs at issue actually operate. The
recent presidential election confirms that the ACA will not be repealed and will be effectuated. It would be easy to dismiss the variations in legislative interpretation as a reflection of ideology in a complex, contentious, and unusually high-profile case, but the decision
seems to invite further litigation. That further litigation offers an
opportunity to compound not only the bad legislative interpretation
but also the sweeping constitutional analysis in the decision. At least
57
58
59

60
61

42 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607–08 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 11, at 76–84 (explaining the open statutory questions that arose due to the severing of the Medicaid expansion and the removal
of the Secretary’s ability to limit funding to the states for nonparticipation).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2641–42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The joint dissent would have invalidated the ACA in its entirety, and the opinion rejected
this remedy for the agreed-upon unconstitutionality of the Medicaid expansion. Id. at
2668 (joint dissent).
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two concerns are worth mentioning here: first, NFIB reinforces a concern that the Court tends not to do healthcare or any other highly
62
regulated and complex area very well. The Court had plenty of
amicus briefs available to help it discern the meaning of the ACA
even if it chose not to accept Congress’s findings, yet the opinions
created an impression that healthcare was just a vehicle for constitutional projects.
Second, the influx of new Medicaid enrollees will highlight a latent problem in the Medicaid Act itself that was complicated by the
ACA and NFIB. If all states implement the Medicaid expansion, the
ACA will add an estimated twenty-one million enrollees into the Medicaid program by 2022, but the remedies available to them when
states fail to deliver the promised benefits of Medicaid are both un63
stable and in flux. Last term, in Douglas v. Independent Living Center
of Southern California, the Court came close to invalidating Supremacy
Clause private rights of action by providers and enrollees who do not
64
receive benefits promised by the Medicaid Act. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion thwarted such a sweeping decision by insisting that
65
HHS exercise primary jurisdiction in the case. Interestingly, the
Douglas majority opinion also displayed a concern for Medicaid as a
66
program, not just the constitutional questions in the case. In contrast, the dissent authored by Chief Justice Roberts jumped straight to
the Supremacy Clause question with little regard for the statutory
scheme or import of the program at hand, consistent with his ap-

62

63

64
65
66

See, e.g., Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 11, at 9 & n.38 (referring to an instance where a justice admitted at oral argument that he often confused Medicare and
Medicaid). The judiciary’s deficiencies in making healthcare-related decisions often arise
in the end-of-life context. See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffmann, Mediating Life and Death Decisions,
36 ARIZ. L. REV. 821 (1994) (advocating for mediation in end-of-life decision-making to
remove the process from under-equipped courts); I. Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR
and End of Life Decision-making, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253 (2004) (advocating for alternative dispute resolution to remove end-of-life disputes from courts given the inadequacies displayed in the Schiavo dispute); TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE
THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 38
(2003) (describing courts’ involvement in the formation of healthcare rights as “far from
consistent”). My observation is slightly broader, that the Court does not perform
healthcare-related analysis particularly well and tends to focus on the constitutional issue
rather than the healthcare context in which it sits, and NFIB is a microcosm of that problem.
See JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, PUB.
NO. 8384, THE COST AND COVERAGE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACA MEDICAID EXPANSION:
NATIONAL AND STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 1 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/upload/8384.pdf.
132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).
Id. at 1210–11.
Id. at 1208–09.
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67

proach in NFIB. The likelihood that more Medicaid enforcement
actions will arise with the influx of new enrollees is bound to test the
Court’s misconstrual of the Medicaid program in NFIB.
It is often said that bad facts make bad law. In this case, the facts
themselves were not bad, but certain justices seemed disposed to bypassing the facts. Thus, in NFIB, a bad reading of the facts has led to
newly shaped constitutional interpretation for three of Congress’s
major Article I powers (commerce, spending, and necessary and
68
proper), and this new interpretation has the potential not only to
impact new healthcare cases, but also to facilitate additional challenges to congressional authority.

67

68

Id. at 1211–15 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). See also Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the
Court, supra note 29, at 515–27 (describing the Douglas litigation); Brietta R. Clark, Medicaid Access, Rate Setting and Payment Suits: How the Obama Administration Is Undermining Its
Own Health Reform Goals, 55 HOW. L.J. 771 (2012) (highlighting Medicaid’s remedy problem and the ways in which the Obama Administration has been undermining its own expansion of Medicaid by articulating a desire to eliminate at least some private rights of action against states).
Four, if the tax power analysis is deemed “new.”

